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Reassessing the State and Local Government Toolkit
This Issue of the Law Review brings together the articles pre-
sented at a two-day conference on state and local government held at
The University of Chicago Law School in June 2009. As the "toolkit"
metaphor invoked in the conference title suggests, participants were
invited to explore the full range of mechanisms that states and locali-
ties can use to spur economic development, provide services to their
constituents, and otherwise pursue their ends as economic, social, and
political actors. While one high-profile tool, eminent domain, has been
the subject of intense scholarly scrutiny, we hoped that the conference
would broaden the academic conversation to encompass some lower-
profile, but equally potent, entries in the state and local policy menu.
Consistent with those aspirations, the articles cover a wide array of
topics and represent a variety of methodological and theoretical pers-
pectives. Examining the policy space open to states and localities is an
especially timely undertaking, as the recent financial meltdown has
placed severe budgetary constraints on subnational governments
while fueling popular resistance to increased taxation. State and local
jurisdictions now offer venues for creatively confronting some of the
most longstanding and enduring dilemmas of governance in the con-
text of these tightening constraints.
There is no free lunch; public goods and services are always cost-
ly. The various techniques discussed at the conference for providing
and funding such goods and services impose both financial and nonfi-
nancial costs. Selecting among them necessarily raises questions of
both distribution and efficiency. One recurrent question is whether it
is "fair" to use regulation to impose costs-or confer benefits-on
some designated group smaller than the entire taxpaying class. If so,
which group, and for what reasons? Another perennial quandary is
whether state and local governments are better able to achieve their
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chosen ends by privatizing costs or whether they should concentrate
on improving public delivery of desired services. Slippages occur in
both public and private arrangements, so it is difficult to know which
method works best and in what context. Nonetheless, the underlying
mode of analysis remains largely the same: How do households and
businesses respond to the rules governments put in place? And can
the rules be changed to make their responses accord better with the
avowed aims of the government agency propounding the rules?
Although many of the articles take certain governmental goals as
a given, several articles raise the prior issue of how, and by whom,
those goals are chosen. These articles also confront another dilemma
endemic to discussions of state and local government: what is the ap-
propriate decisionmaking scale and who decides that question? Tie-
bout's defense of local power assumes that this choice is ordinarily
made in an environment free of externalities. But with local govern-
ments in close physical and pecuniary proximity, externalities -both
positive and negative-are omnipresent. One group or another must
come out on top, but we may be unsure whether a particular outcome
advances or retards social welfare. There are no shortcuts to the analy-
sis. It will not do, for example, to justify an allocation of decisionmak-
ing power to the larger jurisdiction on the ground that the smaller
group is represented in the whole. This argument will surely ring hol-
low to those beleaguered groups who know they always will be out-
voted in the larger arena. James Madison's ever-present fear that ma-jority rule will oppress minority interests extends to actions underta-
ken by state and local governments. But oppression is a game that
anyone can play (or try to play); minorities can also pursue self-
interested goals at the expense of everyone else. Evaluating the rela-
tive potential for misbehavior in all states of the political world is a
tricky if not impossible endeavor. But, difficult or not, that inquiry
becomes ever more salient as devolution of authority continues apace
with the rise of tax increment financing districts, community benefit
agreements, business enterprise zones, and other sublocal entities.
Finding the proper level of government to decide a particular
question is just one of many hard questions faced by public planners
and private citizens alike. Any complex method of decisionmaking
also has a profound temporal element. Devices for entrenching, and
overcoming entrenchment, are as important at the local level as the
filibuster is to the United States Senate. There is a further question of
whether sound decisionmaking requires government transparency or
government confidentiality. Most likely it needs both at different stag-
es of the process. And when the entire system is looked at as a whole,
just who are the real beneficiaries of governmental actions? And who
really pays the costs of the actions? Open discussion could lead to
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excessive delay if it allows blocking coalitions to form. Conversely,
lack of public transparency may serve short-term political ends by
defusing opposition. At the same time it can give knowledgeable in-
siders extraordinary powers which they may not use wisely or fairly.
There is much more that might be said about the rich and diverse
set of articles collected here, but we will step aside and let the reader
make his or her own judgment. Given the multifaceted nature of our
subject, we deem it a mark of the conference's success, and a testa-
ment to the enduring complexities found within the state and local
toolkit, that the results defy easy summarization.
This Introduction would not be complete without noting that nei-
ther the conference nor this Issue of the Law Review would have been
possible without the hard work of the editors of The University of
Chicago Law Review, the financial support of The John M. Olin Foun-
dation, the Sarah Scaife Foundation, Microsoft Corporation, and Visa
U.S.A., and, above all, the tireless efforts of our Law and Economics
program administrator, Marjorie Holme. We are truly grateful for
their support.
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